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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
MARK DERON HARRISON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 890617-CA 
Priority No. 2 
INTRODUCTION 
This petition for rehearing discusses two of the five 
issues addressed in the Harrison opinion—the marital privilege 
issue and the Batson issue.1 Relevant portions of the opinion are 
attached as Appendix 1. 
The primary reason that this Court should grant rehearing 
is that this Court's application of harmless error analysis in these 
two contexts goes beyond mere tolerance to actual encouragement of 
blatant prosecutorial misconduct. In contravention of governing 
law, the opinion repeatedly informs prosecutors that their duty to 
uphold the Utah and United States Constitutions2 is inversely 
proportionate to the quantity of evidence available to support a 
conviction. 
1. See Brown v. Pickard, 11 P. 512 (Utah 1886)(explaining 
circumstances allowing rehearing); Cumminas v. Nielson. 129 P. 619 
(Utah 1913)(same). 
2. E.g. Utah attorney oath of office and Utah Rule of 
Professional Conduct 3.8, in Appendix 2 to this petition; Walker v. 
State, 624 P.2d 687, 691 (Utah 1981). 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
AN EVIDENCE-BASED3 HARMLESS ERROR ANALYSIS 
DOES NOT APPLY TO A PROSECUTORS VIOLATION 
OF THE MARITAL PRIVILEGE. 
As conceded by the State and noted in the Harrison opinion, 
the prosecutor violated Mr. Harrison/s marital privilege, a right 
explicitly protected by the Utah Constitution and the Utah Code. 
Id. at 26-30 and n. 32. 
In apparent disregard of Utah law directly on point with 
this prosecutorial marital privilege violation case, this Court 
concluded that the evidence-based harmless error analysis applied to 
generic prosecutorial misconduct applies in this case: 
We consider the two part Valdez test to effectively 
supersede Brown. In Brown, appellant's rape conviction was 
reversed because of improper prosecutor comments on 
defendant's marital privilege without consideration of whether 
those comments were actually prejudicial and, indeed, despite 
the fact that the evidence in the case supported the 
conviction. The absence of a prejudice analysis in Brown was 
later criticized. See State v. Trusty, 28 Utah 2d 317, 502 
P.2d 113, 115 (1971)(Ellett, J., concurring). Part two of the 
Valdez analysis addresses the prejudice issue overlooked in 
Brown. 
Harrison at 28 n. 33. 
In Brown, the court did not "overlook" the concept of 
prejudice, but noted the diverse approaches to prejudice in the 
context of prosecutorial comment on the marital privilege. State v. 
3. By "evidence-based," Mr. Harrison refers to the Valdez 
test evaluating prosecutorial misconduct in light of the quantum of 
evidence properly admitted in support of a verdict of guilt, which 
is distinguished below from the prejudice analysis traditionally 
applied in cases involving prosecutorial violation of the marital 
privilege, which prejudice analysis focuses on the procedural facts 
of the case and the impact of the misconduct on the jury and the 
exercise of the privilege. 
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Brown, 383 P.2d 930, 932 and n. 3 (Utah 1963). The court noted that 
permission of comment on the privilege largely destroys the 
privilege, and reversed the conviction because the prosecutor's 
comment to the jury in Brown destroyed the privilege in that case 
"and was prejudicial." Id. 
Inasmuch as the Brown court concluded that the comment in 
that case was prejudicial, but also found that "the verdict was 
supported by substantial evidence which furnishes a reasonable basis 
for a finding of defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt," id. 
at 932, Brown contradicts this Court's assumption that an 
evidence-based harmless error analysis applies. 
State v. Trusty, 502 P.2d 113 (Utah 1972), another case 
directly on point with this prosecutorial marital privilege 
violation case, cites Brown with approval: 
[Brown] was a rape case. The defense was alibi: that 
defendant was home with his wife. The wife did not testify. 
In his argument to the jury the district attorney pointed out 
that the wife was the one person who could have corroborated 
the alibi. Under those circumstances we held that the comment 
had the effect of destroying or impairing the privilege, and 
reversed and remanded for a new trial. 
In considering the principle stated in the Brown case and 
its applicability to the instant situation, we concede the 
correctness of these propositions: that any comment by the 
prosecutor which in a substantial way will impair or disparage 
a claim of privilege is improper and therefore is error; and 
that if it be such that there is a possibility that it 
prejudiced the defendant, in the sense that there is any 
likelihood that there may have been a different result, then 
the error should be deemed prejudicial and another trial 
granted. 
Id. at 114. 
Examination of the prejudice analysis of the Trusty court 
demonstrates once again that in cases involving prosecutorial 
violation of the marital privilege, the focus is not on the evidence 
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supporting the verdict of guilt, but is on the procedural facts of 
the case and the impact of the misconduct on the jury and the 
exercise of the privilege. The Trusty prejudice analysis makes no 
mention of evidence of guilt: 
In regard to the particular situation here these comments 
are pertinent. First, there was no objection upon which the 
court could act until after the defendant had answered the 
question. The second, if there had been any implication 
adverse to the defendant, the trial judge gave an appropriate 
cautionary instruction which it should be assumed that 
conscientious jurors would follow. 
It is appreciated that in certain exigent circumstances 
the two foregoing observations might be set aside in order to 
rule more fundamentally upon the merits. Nevertheless, we 
have mentioned them in this case because they have a bearing 
upon and should be considered in connection with what we 
regard as the more important and controlling consideration: 
whether in surveying the total circumstances it appears that 
there is any reasonable likelihood of any substantial 
prejudice to the defendant under the rules hereinabove stated. 
When the district attorney asked the question under 
consideration here: "I assume then, your wife will testify to 
the same thing . . .?" before any objection was made, the 
defendant stated what the trial court, and this court, should 
be able to assume expressed what he intended the court and 
jury to believe was his view of the matter when he voiced the 
" . . . hope [that] she testifies to the truth . . .," etc. He 
still had the choice of calling her as a witness, or of not 
calling her, and of having an appropriate instruction thereon 
if he so desired. It seems to us that it would be mere 
conjecture to presume that a jury would necessarily draw an 
inference adverse to the defendant from the occurrence. Also 
having an important bearing on this problem is the fact that 
the court protected the defendant's right to prevent his wife 
from testifying just as effectively as that could be done in 
the event of a new trial. 
Id. at 115. 
This Court, in applying the generic evidence-based harmless 
error test set forth in Valdez. found the violation of the marital 
privilege harmless in light of evidence supporting the verdict of 
guilt, and failed to discuss the procedural posture of the case and 
the impact the prosecutor's comment had on the jurors and the 
exercise of the privilege. Harrison at 29-30. 
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Application of the proper Brown-Trusty prejudice test 
demonstrates that the trial court's and prosecutor's violation of 
the marital privilege in this case left Mr. Harrison with no 
procedural mode of exercising the privilege effectively, destroying 
the privilege. Because Mrs. Harrison was repeatedly identified 
sitting in court, and the prosecutor established that Mrs. Harrison 
testified at the preliminary hearing but was not able to testify at 
trial because Mr. Harrison had married her (M.H. 3-8, 67-69; R. 3; 
T. 93, 145, 192, 420, 501, 503-504, 507, 639-640), the jurors were 
directly confronted with the upsetting idea that Mr. Harrison was 
withholding evidence from them through the exercise of his 
constitutional right. See State v. Wilson, 771 P.2d 1077, 1080 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989)(referring to the marital privilege, this Court 
quoted the United States Supreme Court's opinion, Trammel v. United 
States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980), "As Jeremy Bentham observed more than a 
century and a half ago, such a privilege goes far beyond making 
'every man's house his castle,' and permits a person to convert his 
house into 'a den of thieves.'"). 
The trial court's overruling of defense counsel's objection 
to the prosecutor's improper closing argument interpreting the jury 
instruction on the marital privilege (T. 639-640) undoubtedly 
reinforced the jurors' abhorrence of Mr. Harrison's exercise of his 
constitutional right. 
While the Trusty court indicated that the intent of a 
prosecutor in violating the marital privilege is "not the critical 
consideration," id., 502 P.2d at 114 n. 3, this Court should realize 
that the intent of the prosecutor is nonetheless a valid 
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consideration. The privilege violated by the prosecutor is one that 
was explicitly invoked by Mr. Harrison and repeatedly discussed in 
the circuit and district courts (e.g. M.H. 3-8; 67-69; T. 420, 501, 
503-507; R. 3), and it cannot be doubted that the prosecutor was 
aware of the constitutional right he violated. 
This Court should rehear this issue, and correct the 
impression published in the Harrison opinion that as long as 
prosecutors have sufficient evidence to support a verdict, they are 
free to trample fundamental constitutional rights. 
II. 
HARMLESS ERROR ANALYSIS DOES NOT APPLY 
TO BATSON ERRORS. 
In the Harrison opinion, this Court indicated that harmless 
error analysis applies to a prosecutor's improper peremptory 
challenges, understated that a showing of prejudice is "a difficult 
showing to make," and encouraged prosecutors to assert the harmless 
error doctrine as a defense to claims of improper jury selection: 
Because we have determined that the trial court did not 
clearly err in finding no racial discrimination in the State's 
peremptory challenges, we do not reach the issue of whether 
Harrison was prejudiced by those challenges. However, if we 
had found clear error, Harrison's conviction could be affirmed 
only by showing that the error was "harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt." Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 
(1967) (quoted in Cantu I, 750 P.2d at 597). This is a 
difficult showing to make, and prosecutors who are questioned 
in the future about possibly improper peremptory challenges 
would do well to consider this in formulating their responses, 
making sure that they meet the Batson requirements. 
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Id. .if 16-1' '.4 
While this Court is correct that the "Cantu Ilf opinion 
asserts that the Chapman harmless error tloctrine applies in this 
context., it; is useful to note that Cantu I is a plurality opinion 
which appears to reflect the view of only one justice that harmless 
error analysis applies. Compare State v. Cantu, *}\>v V.Ad 591, 597 
(Utah liHS)(opinion of Justice Howe, asserting application of 
harmless error analysis) with 750 P.2d 591, 598 (Utah 1988)(opinions 
of Justice Zimmerman, Justice t)urh<im, JucRje Orme, and Justice Hall, 
making no mention of application of harmless error analysis) When 
the Cantu case returned to the supreme court after remand the 
trial court, HIP supreme court reversed Mr Cantu's conviction on 
the basis of a prosecutor's improper peremptory challenge, without 
analyzing whether the prosecutor's improper peremptory cha] lenge was 
prejudicial in I nihil of evidence presented supporting Mr. Cantu's 
conviction. State v. Cantu, 778 P.2d 517 (Utah 1989). 
4. Similar indications that concepts of harmless error and 
prejudice apply in the context of Batson-type challenges can be 
found in the opinion, as follows: 
Finally, if the State's peremptory challenges were improper, 
was such impropriety prejudicial to Harrison? 
Id. at 6. 
Because Harrison failed to show obvious error, we need 
not consider whether he was harmed by the State's use of 
peremptory challenges to limit the number of women on the 
jury. We seriously doubt, however, that Harrison could 
demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result 
had he been tried by a jury including six or seven women, as 
opposed to five. 
Id. at 16 n.15. 
But see Harrison at 15, n. 13 (in finding that 
Mr. Harrison's liberty interest is not at stake, this Court 
explained, "The issue, as presented, has more to do with the public 
interest in a fair justice system than it does with Harrison's 
liberty.") 
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Harmless error analysis does not apply to a prosecutors 
improper peremptory challenge because the harm caused by the 
improper peremptory challenge is not limited to a defendant's case. 
As this Court recognized in Harrison, and as various members of the 
United States Supreme Court have recognized in Batson v. Kentucky 
476 U.S. 79 (1986)r and in Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. , 110 
S.Ct. 803 (1990), the damage caused by a prosecutor's improper 
peremptory challenge is not limited to the impact the misconduct has 
on the outcome of a defendant's case, but extends to harm the 
excluded jurors and the entire justice system. See Harrison at 
7-8. A defendant voicing a Batson challenge is vested with the 
responsibility to vindicate not only his own rights, but also the 
rights of the prospective jurors and the proper functioning of the 
justice system, id., and should not be saddled with the impossible 
burden to show prejudice. Numerous cases involving Batson claims 
and other improper jury selection issues so recognize, and call for 
reversal without engaging in harmless error analysis, some 
explicitly rejecting harmless error analysis.5 
Counsel for Mr. Harrison is unable to find any decisions, 
other than Cantu I and Harrison, requiring a prejudice analysis in 
the context of Batson-type claims. 
The Harrison opinion is without basis in informing 
prosecutors that their constitutional duty to refrain from 
exercising peremptory challenges on the basis of group bias is 
inversely proportionate to the quantity of evidence available to 
support a conviction. For this reason, rehearing is requested. 
5. See cases cited in Appendix 3. 
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III. 
THE PROSECUTOR'S VIOLATIONS OF EQUAI PROTECTION 
REQUIRE REVERSAL. 
This Court's Batson analysis contain;-.' additional legal 
errors * versights that require correction. 
A. MR -ROVED THE EQUAL PROTECTION VIOLATIONS. 
This Court correctly noted that under United States Postal 
Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 4<>" U.S. - 11 (1983), once the 
party accused of discrimination explains the allegedly 
discriminatory actions, the adequacy of the prima facie case 
normally triggering the obligation to explain the actions is moot. 
Harrison at 12. However, this Court was less than clear in 
explaining how the ultimate issue of discrimination is to be 
resolved once the .-allegedly discriminatory actions have been 
explained. As explained in Aikens, once the explanation of the 
actions has been given, there are two separate -approaches to the 
ultimate finding of discrimination: the direct mode of proof 
relating to all the facts and circumstances of the case (applied in 
the Harrison opinion at page 13), and I ht» indirect mode of proof 
focusing on the credibility of the explanation. In the words of the 
Aikens Court, 
As we stated in [Texas Department of Community Affairs v.] 
Burdine [450 U.S. 248 (1981)]: 
"The plaintiff retains the burden of 
persuasion . . . . [H]e may succeed in this either 
directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory 
reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly 
by showing that the employees proffered explanation is 
unworthy of credence." 450 U.S. at 256, 67 L.Ed.2d 207, 
101 S.Ct. 1089. 
Aikens at 716. 
1. MR. HARRISON PROVED THE EQUAL PROTECTION VIOLATIONS INDIRECTLY 
BECAUSE THE PROSECUTORS EXPLANATIONS OF THE CHALLENGES WERE NOT 
CREDIBLE. 
While this Court was correct in noting that "the court was 
free to accept as credible the prosecutor's assertion that the 
challenges were made in an effort to obtain a gender-balanced 
jury[,]" Harrison at 13, this Court still has an obligation to 
review the record and determine if the factual finding of the trial 
court was clearly erroneous. State v. Cantu. 778 P.2d 517, 518 
(Utah 1989). 
As explained in Mr. Harrison's opening brief at page 16, 
and in Mr. Harrison's reply brief at pages 14 and 15, but entirely 
omitted from the State's brief and this Court's opinion, the 
prosecutor's assertion that he struck jurors Gomez and Rezendez 
because he wanted a gender balanced jury is not credible because the 
prosecutor, when faced with a prospective juror group with females 
in the majority, struck a male with his first peremptory challenge. 
Under Aikens, because the prosecutor's explanations of the 
peremptory challenges in this case were not credible, Mr. Harrison 
proved the Equal Protection violations. 
2. MR. HARRISON PROVED THE EQUAL PROTECTION VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY. 
In finding that Mr. Harrison did not carry the burden of 
proving the equal protection violations, this Court relied on 
Mr. Harrison's perceived failure to present a prima facie case 
triggering the prosecutor's obligation to explain the peremptory 
challenges. Harrison at 13. Review of this Court's discussion of 
the prima facie case reveals a legal and a factual oversight of how 
discrimination is further proved by the record in this case. 
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I\I page 1J ourt indicated, "Harrison's argument that 
the prosecutor's voir dire of the peremptorily challenged jurors was 
suspiciously sparse was not made to the t rial < jourt " The Batson 
decision, however, places the duty of reviewing the voir dire not on 
defense counsel, but on the trial court: 
In deciding whether the defendant has made the requisite 
showing, the trial court should consider all relevant 
circumstances. For example, a "pattern of strikes against 
black jurors included in the particular venire might give rise 
to an inference of discrimination. Similarly, the 
prosecutor's questions and statements during voir dire 
examination and in exercising his challenges may support or 
refute an inference of discriminatory purpose. These examples 
are merely illustrative. We have confidence that trial 
judges, experienced in voir dire, will be able to decide if 
the circumstances concerning the prosecutor's use of 
peremptory challenges creates a prima facie case of 
discrimination against black jurors. 
Batson, 476 U.S. 79, 96-97 (emphasis added). 
As a factual matter, trial counsel did address the issue of 
the def icien I ./1 > i i d Ire: 
Your Honor, I would indicate that it appears that there 
is no significant difference between the persons that Mr. Cope 
indicates he was choosing between. As to Ms. Rezendez there's 
absolutely very little information about her. She's single, 
she's into printing, she watches T.V. and reads T.V. Guide and 
lives in an area where some other jurors apparently live. 
And as to Ms. Gomez there was very little information as 
well under which—and I think that Mr. Cope's choice of 
striking them appears to me to still have a racial overtone 
of, these are the people I like the least, I thought would do 
the less well for me and I believe that is inappropriate and I 
think it denies my defendant an opportunity to have a fair 
cross-section of the community represented. 
(T. 77).6 
6. Compare Harrison at pages 21-26 (while it was the 
State's burden to justify the warrantless search of the Harrison's 
diaper bag, after rejecting the trial prosecutor's only 
justification (consent), this Court justified the search of the 
diaper bag with a "search incident to arrest" theory which the 
prosecutor did not assert because he assumed it factually unfounded 
(footnote continued) 
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The prosecutor removed fifty percent of the minority 
prospective jurors with peremptory challenges. The record displays 
nothing about these jurors to distinguish them from other jurors who 
were not challenged by the prosecutor. See Appendix 2 to 
Mr. Harrison's opening brief. The prosecutor's explanation that he 
struck jurors Gomez and Rezendez because he "liked them the least" 
"for whatever reason" is a vague and legally insufficient response 
to an allegation of discrimination. Mr. Harrison is "'entitled to 
rely on the fact, as to which there can be no dispute, that 
peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that 
permits 'those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate.,n 
Harrison at 7 n. 4, quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. at 96, 
quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953). 
These circumstances combine to demonstrate Mr. Harrison's 
direct proof of the Equal Protection violations. 
B. THE PROSECUTOR'S EXERCISE OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES ON THE BASIS 
OF GENDER IS A VIOLATION OF BATSON AND UTAH LAW THAT SHOULD BE 
ADDRESSED ON THE MERITS BY THIS COURT. 
Resting on waiver grounds, this Court declined to address 
the merits of Mr. Harrison's arguments that the prosecutors 
explanation of the peremptory challenges of jurors Gomez and 
Rezendez on the basis of the gender violated federal Equal 
Protection and Utah law. Harrison at 13-17 and accompanying 
footnotes. 
(footnote 6 continued) 
(M.H. 57) , and with an "inevitable discovery/babies will be babies11 
exception that the State has never asserted as a legal theory and 
has never demonstrated as a factual matter); petition for rehearing 
in State v. Lorenzo Hubbard, case number 900128-CA (discussing 
substantive and procedural burdens of State in justifying 
warrantless searches). 
1. BATSON PROHIBITS IIIh EXERCISE OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES ON THE 
BASIS OF GENDER. 
As noted in Mi, Harrison's opening brief at pages 17 and 
18, and the letter of supplemental authority filed in this Court and 
the cases cited therein, peremptory dial lunges exercised on the 
basis of gender violate the fourteenth amendment as interpreted by 
Batson. See e.g. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 IKS. 79, 97-98 
(1986)(discussing JlJmial n gioup bias in exercise of 
peremptory challenges); United States v. De Gross. 913 F.2d 1417 
(9th Cir. 1990)(reversal for gender discrimination in exercise of 
peremptory cha J ] enges; relyi in| on Batson but decided under fifth 
amendment because case arose in federal court). 
This Court's opinion fails to address this contention. 
2- UTAH LAW PROHIBITS THE EXERCISE OF PEREMPT* DRY CHALLENGES ON THE 
BASIS OF GENDER. 
This Court's discussion of the legality of I: tie prosecutor's 
alleged jender-based peremptory challenges focuses on various 
exceptions to the waiver doctrine, and appears to indicate that this 
Court will not address the merits of an issue nn appeal unless a 
plain error occurred, a liberty interest is jeopardized, or 
exceptional circumstances exist. Mr. Harrison is able to make any 
of these three threshold *• )mw i uqs, tnd t.his tourt should address the 
merits of his argument on rehearing. 
a. GENDER DISCRIMINATION IN JURY SELECTION IS PLAIN ERROR, AND 
EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES INVOLVED IN THIS ISSUE JUSTIFY THIS 
COURT'S ADDRESSING THE MERITS OF THE ISSUE. 
The pi din language law prohibits gender 
discrimination in jury selection. Constitution of Utah Article IV, 
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section 1; Utah Code Ann. section 78-46-3, in Appendix 2 to this 
petition. In Harrison, however, this Court determined that gender 
discrimination in jury selection does not qualify as plain error: 
In TState v.1 Anderson. [789 P.2d 27 (Utah 1990),] the 
Utah Supreme Court declined to consider a constitutional 
objection to a criminal sentence that had not been raised in 
the trial court, because the claimed error did not satisfy the 
"obviousness" requirement for plain error. 789 P.2d at 29. 
That is, the alleged error was not one that should have been 
recognized by the trial court when it occurred. Id. Here, 
given that Harrison's trial Jury had five women, the use of 
peremptory challenges to keep additional women from being 
seated could not have been obvious error. Nor has it been 
determined by Utah courts whether gender-based peremptory 
challenges are constitutionally or statutorily impermissible, 
Harrison at 15 (footnote and citation omitted, emphasis added). 
This reasoning is erroneous. The violations of 
Mr. Harrison's right to be tried by a jury that is selected in a 
legal manner, and the violation of the rights of jurors Gomez and 
Rezendez to serve on the jury were not obviated by the permission of 
service of other female jurors. 
The plain language of the Utah Constitution and Code does 
not depend on judicial interpretation for validity. 
As explained in point II of this petition, because the 
prosecutor's discriminatory peremptory challenges damage not only 
Mr. Harrison's rights, but also the rights of the stricken jurors 
and the fundamental fairness of the justice system, the prejudice 
prong traditionally applied in the plain error test cannot apply. 
It is highly unlikely that any defendant challenging the 
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges will ever be able to 
show traditional prejudice. See Harrison at 16-17 and n. 15. Yet 
at stake are not only Mr. Harrison's rights, but also the rights of 
the jurors and the fairness of the justice system. These 
- 14 -
exceptional circumstances call for a decision on the merits by this 
Court. 
b. MR. HARRISON'S LIBERTY IS AT STAKE. 
Part of the reason this Court declined f • le on llu-
merits Harrison's claim that it is illegal t discriminate in 
jury selection on the basis of gender is this Court's view that 
Mr. Harrison's liberty interest it- no1 «i'i stake: 
In this case, we do not find a liberty interest at stake 
because of the remoteness of the gender bias issue to 
Harrison's main claim of improper racial motivation. See also 
note 15, infra [explaining doubt that Mr. Harrison could show 
prejudice]. The issue, as presented, has more to do with the 
public interest in a fair justice system than it does with 
Harrison's liberty. 
Harrison at 15 n. 13. 
Inasmuch as i in remedy sought b) Mi Harrison and granted 
in similar cases, e.g., United States v. De Gross, 913 F.2d 1417 
(9th Cir. 1990), is reversal of the conviction, Mr. Harr ison' s 
liberty is <il strike .mil I his Court should rule on the merits. 
State v. Breckenridae, 688 P.2d 440, 441 (Utah 1983). 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Harrison respectfully requests rehearing of this case. 
DATED this Js day of January. 1991. 
VER^ICE S .V AH CHING 
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The jury found Harrison guilty of manslaughter, a lesser 
included offense of the second degree murder charge. Harrison 
argues on appeal that: (1) the State's peremptory challenges 
violated the federal constitution's equal protection clause; 
(2) the refusal to allow testimony about the details of prior 
threats against him and the refusal to allow the reading of 
John Bray's prior testimony to the jury improperly compromised 
his defense; (3) the search of the diaper bag violated his 
rights against unreasonable search and seizure; (4) various 
comments and questions by the prosecutor violated his right to 
a fair trial; and (5) the reasonable doubt instruction given to 
the jury was improper. 
ANALYSIS 
I. PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES 
Harrison argues that the State's peremptory challenges 
violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth 
amendment to the federal constitution. Analysis of this issue 
requires as many as five steps. First, does Harrison, a black, 
have standing to raise an equal protection objection to the 
exclusion of Hispanics from his jury? Second, was his 
objection timely raised before the trial court? Next, if 
timely raised, did Harrison establish a prima facie case of 
improper discrimination, requiring the State to explain its 
peremptory challenges? Fourth, if a prima facie case was 
established, was the prosecutor's explanation of the challenges 
adequate to support the trial court's finding that there was no 
improper racial discrimination? Finally, if the State's 
peremptory challenges were improper, was such impropriety 
prejudicial to Harrison? 
Standing -
The underpinning for Harrison's argument is Batson v. 
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). Batson set the standards for 
determining when a prosecutor's peremptory juror challenges 
violate the equal protection clause. Under Batson. a prima 
facie case of improper discrimination in the exercise of 
peremptory challenges is raised by showing (1) that defendant 
is a member of a cognizable racial group; (2) that the 
prosecutor used peremptory challenges to remove members of 
defendant's race from the jury panel; and (3) that these facts 
and other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the 
panelists were removed because of their race. 476 U.S. at 96; 
see also State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591, 595-97 (Utah 1988) 
("CantU I") (explaining fiaiiQn).4 
The first two elements of a Batson prima facie case appear 
to require racial identity between an accused and peremptorily 
stricken jurors, and some courts have held that such identity 
is required before a Batson equal protection objection can be 
raised. However, the United States Supreme Court recently 
reserved judgment on this issue, in Holland v. Illinois, 493 
U.S. , 110 S.Ct. 803, 811 & n.3 (1990).bIn fact, four 
members of the present Court have indicated their belief that 
lack of racial identity should not bar such an objection. Xd. 
at 811-12 (Kennedy, J., concurring); 813-14 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting, joined by Brennan (now retired) and Blackman, JJ.); 
820-22 (Stevens, J,, dissenting). 
In his Holland dissent, Justice Marshall pointed out that 
a criminal defendant, in making a Batson objection to 
peremptory challenges, is asserting more than his individual 
4. The defendant is also "entitled to rely on the fact, as to 
which there can be no dispute, that peremptory challenges 
constitute a jury selection practice that permits 'those to 
discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate.•- Batson, 476 
U.S. at 96 (quoting Averv v. Georgia. 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)). 
5. SSfi/ e.g. . United States v. Rodriguez-Cardenas, 866 F.2d 
390, 392 (11th Cir. 1989); United States v. Townslev, 856 F.2d 
1189, 1190 (8th Cir. 1988) (en banc); United States v. Anoiulo. 
847 F.2d 956, 984 (1st Cir. 1988), CSJLLU denied, U.S. , 
109 S.Ct. 314; United States v. Vaccaro. 816 F.2d 443, 457 (9th 
Cir. 1987). Our review of these cases reveals that their 
holdings on this issue are simply based on recitations of 
patson's racial identity language, without analysis. We, 
however, are wary of standing analyses that are so 
-insufficiently sensitive to . . . legitimate policy 
considerations." In re J.W.F., 145 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 18 
(1990). 
6. Holland held that a white defendant did have standing to 
object, on sixth amendment -fair cross section- grounds, to the 
use of peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from the jury 
that tried him. 110 S.Ct. at 805-06. However, the Court then 
held that the fair cross section requirement, applicable to the 
venires from which jurors are selected, does not extend to the 
use of peremptory challenges in selecting the actual trial jury. 
interest in being tried by a jury from which members of his own 
race have not been wrongfully excluded. Such a defendant 
raises -not only his rights, but also those of the members of 
the venire and of the general public." Id. at 813-14 
(Marshall, J., dissenting). A Batson objection asserts the 
rights of potential jurors to not be excluded from the jury on 
account of race, HatiOH/ 4 7 6 U.S. at 87, as well as the 
public's interest in preserving confidence in the fairness of 
our justice system. Id. Justice Kennedy added, "To bar the 
[equal protection] claim whenever the defendant's race is not 
the same as the juror's would be to concede that racial 
exclusion of citizens from the duty, and honor, of jury service 
will be tolerated, or even condoned." Holland, 110 S.Ct. at 
811-12 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
The question of whether a defendant who does not share 
racial identity with the stricken juror(s) has standing to 
raise a Batson equal protection objection to a prosecutor's 
peremptory challenges is now pending before the Supreme Court, 
in Powers v. Ohio, U.S. , 110 S.Ct. 1109 (Feb. 20, 1990) 
(granting certiorari). Holland, however, suggests that in 
Powers, the Court will reject racial identity with excluded 
jurors as a standing requirement for such objections. 
We also note that in the present case, even though 
Harrison and the peremptorily excluded jurors are not of the 
same race, they do share racial minority status. Like 
Harrison, a black man, the excluded jurors, Hispanics or 
Hispanic-surnamed people, belong to a racially cognizable group 
for purposes of Batson equal protection analysis. Cantu I, 750 
P.2d at 596 (citing Castaneda v. Partida. 430 U.S. 482 (1977), 
and Fields v. People, 732 P.2d 1145, 1153 (Colo. 1987)). The 
existence of shared though not identical minority status, plus 
the likelihood that racial identity will be rejected as a 
prerequisite for raising a Batson objection to the exercise of 
peremptory challenges, persuades us that Harrison has standing, 
on equal protection grounds, to object to the State's 
peremptory challenges in this case. 
Timeliness-
The State invites us to reject Harrison's objection to the 
prosecutor's peremptory challenges because it was not raised 
until after the jury was sworn, and was therefore untimely 
under section 78-46-16(1) (Supp. 1990) of Utah's Jury Selection 
and Service Act. That section states, with our emphasis: 
(1) Within seven days after the moving party 
discovered, or by the exercise of diligence 
could have discovered the grounds therefore 
[sic], and in any event before the trial jury 
is sworn to try the case, a party may move to 
stay the proceedings or to quash an 
indictment, or for other appropriate relief, 
on the ground of substantial failure to comply 
with this act in selecting a grand or trial 
jury. 
We first note that the State's objection to the 
timeliness of Harrison's objection is itself untimely, 
appearing nowhere in the record of the trial court 
proceedings- More important, however, is the fact that 
Harrison's objection was not made under "this act," i.e., the 
Jury Selection and Service Act, but was instead based on the 
federal constitution. 
In State v. Tillman. 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987), our 
supreme court noted that constitutional objections to jury 
panels fall outside the framework of the Jury Selection and 
Service Act. Id. at 574 n.115. Harrison's objection to the 
State's peremptory challenges was constitutionally based, and 
therefore was not barred by the time constraint of section 
78-46-16(1). 
Although not argued by the State nor Harrison, we find 
that Utah R. Crim. P. 18 is applicable to Harrison's 
constitutionally-grounded objection to the State's peremptory 
challenges. Rule 18(c)(2) states that challenges to an 
individual juror "may be made only before the jury is sworn to 
try the action, except the court may, for good cause, permit it 
to be made after the juror is sworn but before any of the 
evidence is presented.- While the trial court did not 
explicitly find good cause for allowing consideration of the 
objection on its merits, it did so implicitly by allowing 
counsel to proceed with their arguments. Harrison's objection 
7. The Utah Supreme Court's determination was based upon 
review of the United States Senate report on the analogous 
Federal Jury Selection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1867 (1982). That 
report indicated that the federal act's procedures for 
objecting to jury selection applied only to alleged violations 
of the act and not to constitutional objections. S. Rep. No. 
891, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1967) (quoted in Tillman. 750 
P.2d at 574 n.115). 
was made and argued immediately after the jury was sworn in, 
before the challenged jurors were excused from service, and 
before opening statements of counsel. ££• State v. Bankhead, 
727 P.2d 216, 217 (Utah 1986) (per curiam) (pre-Tillman case: 
constitutional objection to jury selection untimely under 
section 78-46-16(1) where not raised until after all evidence 
was presented to jury). 
Further, Harrison met the requirement of raising and 
obtaining a ruling on his constitutional objection in the trial 
court, to preserve it for appeal. Salt Lake County v. 
Carlston, 776 P.2d 653, 655-56 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). We find 
that Harrison's objection to the peremptory challenges was 
timely and therefore proceed to the merits of his argument. 
Prima Facie Case. 
Setting aside any requirement of racial identity between 
a defendant and challenged jurors, a prima facie case of racial 
discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges is 
raised when the relevant facts and circumstances surrounding 
the challenges raise the inference that they were used to 
exclude potential jurors because of their race. Batson, 476 
U.S. at 96; Cantu I, 750 P.2d at 597. Once such a prima facie 
showing is made, the state must provide a race-neutral 
explanation, related to the case being tried, for its 
peremptory challenges. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98. The 
explanation must also be clear, reasonably specific, and 
legitimate. State v. Cantu, 778 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah 1989) 
("Cantu 11"). 
Here the State argues that Harrison failed to raise a 
prima facie case because he made no showing, beyond the fact 
that they had Hispanic surnames, that the stricken jurors were 
members of any racial minority. However, our review of the 
record reveals that, in an earlier objection to the composition 
of the venire from which the jury was selected, the trial court 
observed that the jurors in question, along with three others, 
did appear to be members of racial minorities. ' We agree with 
Harrison that more detailed inquiry into the race of 
peremptorily challenged jurors is unnecessary in the context of 
8. In denying Harrison's objection that the venire appeared to 
underrepresent minorities, the trial court identified five of 
the thirty-two venire members as potential minority members. 
This identification was based upon appearance and upon surnames. 
a Batson equal protection objection, and find that the minority 
status of the challenged jurors was adequately established.9 
A prima facie showing of the improper use of peremptory 
juror challenges requires more than simply showing that one or 
more minority jurors were peremptorily stricken, however. 
Batson, 476 U.S. at 101 (White, J., concurring); Cantu I. 750 
P.2d at 597. The Batson Court gave only sparing, 
••illustrative" guidance as to what other relevant circumstances 
give rise to a prima facie case: "[A] 'pattern' of strikes 
against [minority] jurors might give rise to an inference of 
discrimination. Similarly, the prosecutor's questions and 
statements during voir dire examination and in exercising his 
challenges may support or refute an inference of discriminatory 
purpose." 476 U.S. at 97. 
It is doubtful that Harrison showed a pattern of 
minority juror strikes here. Two other possible minority 
jurors identified earlier by the trial court in fact served on 
the trial jury; the fifth minority juror was excused for cause, 
a hearing problem. Additionally, Harrison's argument that the 
prosecutor's voir dire of the peremptorily challenged jurors 
was suspiciously sparse was not made to the trial court. It 
appears, therefore, that Harrison did not establish a prima 
facie case of improper peremptory juror challenges, and that 
the trial court need not have asked the prosecutor to give 
race-neutral reasons for the challenges. 
The State, however, did not argue to the trial court 
that Harrison had failed to make out a prima facie case. 
Instead, the prosecutor sought to rebut Harrison's allegation 
by giving race-neutral reasons for the questioned peremptory 
challenges. The Batson Court indicated that "prima facie 
burden of proof rules" developed in cases brought under Title 
9. While we are disinclined to find that minority status can 
be established solely from one's surname, but see Cantu I. 750 
P.2d at 596, we also recognize that a prosecutor bent on racial 
discrimination is unlikely to make inquiries to confirm a 
juror's suspected minority status before improperly using a 
peremptory challenge to exclude the juror. Because Batson and 
its progeny seek to prevent the exercise of peremptory 
challenges with the intent or purpose to eliminate jurors 
solely because of race, it appears to us that concrete proof of 
the actual race of the jurors so challenged is, at most, of 
secondary importance. 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 may apply to the analysis 
of peremptory juror challenges, Batson, 476 U.S. at 94 n.18. 
In one such case, United States Postal Service Bd. of Governors 
v. Aikens. 460 U.S. 711 (1983), the Court noted that once a 
party accused of improper discrimination attempts to rebut that 
accusation with evidence that the challenged action was proper, 
the question of whether a prima facie case was made in the 
first place "is no longer relevant.- Id. at 715. Instead, the 
focus shifts to the ultimate issue of whether improper 
discrimination has occurred. I£. at 715-16. Similarly, the 
issue of whether Harrison made out a prima facie case of 
improper discrimination in the State's peremptory challenges 
became irrelevant when the prosecutor failed to contest it at 
trial. We therefore proceed to the next step of our analysis, 
the question of whether the State adequately rebutted 
Harrison's allegation of improper use of peremptory challenges, 
and whether the trial court erred in ultimately finding that 
the challenges were not racially motivated. 
Adequacy of the State's Rebuttal. 
Despite the burden shifting under the prima facie 
showing rules just described, the burden of showing racial 
discrimination in a prosecutor's use of peremptory juror 
challenges remains on the defendant. Batson, 476 U.S. at 93. 
Therefore, once the prosecutor gives race-neutral reasons, 
related to the case, for the peremptory challenges,*® it is 
proper, as was done here, to allow the defendant to attack the 
credibility of those reasons. In the end, however, the trial 
court's finding on whether the challenges were racially 
motivated turns largely on credibility, and is entitled to 
great deference on review. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21; £an£ll 
XI, 778 P.2d at 518; Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). 
In asserting that the objected-to peremptory challenges 
were gender-based rather than racially motivated, the 
prosecutor failed to give race-neutral and case-related reasons 
for striking the Hispanic women, instead of other women, from 
the jury. The prosecutor's explanation that he simply liked 
the Hispanics less than the other potential female jurors, "for 
whatever reason," amounted to no more than an unsupported 
denial of racial discrimination, and was a legally inadequate 
10. w[W]e emphasize that the prosecutor's explanation need not 
rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for 
cause.- Batson. 476 U.S. at 97 (citations omitted). 
rebuttal. See Batson. 476 U.S. at 98 (prosecutor cannot rebut 
allegation of improper discrimination merely by denying 
discriminatory motive). 1 
However, even though the State's rebuttal of Harrison's 
allegation was inadequate, we do not believe that we are 
compelled to find clear error in the trial court's conclusion 
that the peremptory challenges were not racially motivated. We 
have already noted Harrison's failure to raise a prima facie 
case of improper peremptory challenges. Although the question 
of whether a prima facie case was made became irrelevant when 
the State offered reasons for its peremptory challenges, it 
remained proper for the court to consider all relevant facts 
and circumstances surrounding the State's peremptory challenges 
in ultimately determining whether they had been racially 
motivated. The absence of a pattern of minority strikes 
supported the trial court's finding that the strikes were not 
racially motivated. Indeed, in ruling on Harrison's objection, 
the court noted that at least one juror of apparent minority 
origin remained on the jury. Additionally, the court was free 
to accept as credible the prosecutor's assertion that the 
challenges were made in an effort to obtain a gender-balanced 
jury. Therefore, there was no clear error in finding that the 
State's peremptory challenges were not racially motivated. 
Harrison claims, however, that in responding to his 
federal equal protection objection to the State's peremptory 
challenges, the State effectively admitted violating Utah Code 
II. While failing to specify why he challenged the 
Hispanic-surnamed women, the prosecutor actually gave a 
race-neutral and case-related reason that he could have used to 
justify a challenge to the other female, potentially Hispanic 
juror whom he actually left on the jury. He admitted to having 
been "a little bit worried" about this juror, who had a cousin 
who had been accused of murder. This kind of concern has been 
accepted in Batson-type objections to peremptory challenges. 
£££, e.g./ United States v. vaccaro/ 816 F.2d 443, 457 (9th 
Cir. 1987) (juror had brother convicted of robbery). For other 
examples of peremptory challenge reasons that have been held 
adequate, see United States v. Anaiulo. 847 F.2d 956, 985 n.37 
(1st Cir. 1988); People v. Tallev, 152 111. App. 3d 971, 105 
III. Dec. 800, 504 N.E.2d 1318, 1327 (App. 4 Dist. 1987); 
Townsend v. State. 730 S.W.2d 24, 26 (Tex. App. 1987); Gradv v. 
Siitfi/ 730 S.W.2d 191, 194-95 (Tex. App. 1987); Chambers -v. 
State, 724 S.W.2d 440, 442 (Tex. App. 1987). 
Ann. § 78-46-3 (1987), which prohibits a citizen's exclusion 
from jury service on account of gender.*2 He also asserts 
that the State ran afoul o£ article IV, section 1 of the Utah 
Constitution, which states: -The rights of citizens of the 
State of Utah to vote and hold office shall not be denied or 
abridged on account of sex. Both male and female citizens of 
this State shall enjoy equally all civil, political and 
religious rights and privileges.-
Harrison's objection to the gender basis of the State's 
peremptory challenges was not raised in the trial court. 
Because this objection includes a constitutional basis, we 
could consider it for the first time on appeal if we were to 
find that it has an impact on Harrison's liberty. State v. 
Anderson, 789 P.2d 27, 29 (Utah 1990); Salt Lake County v. 
Carlston, 776 P.2d 653, 655 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). However, 
because this case involves neither plain error, Anderson, 789 
P.2d at 29, nor exceptional circumstances, Jolivet v. Cook, 784 
P.2d 1148, 1151 (Utah 1989), cert, dfiflisd, U.S. , 110 
S.Ct. 751 (1990), and does not impact Harrison's liberty, we 
decline to consider it now.13 
12. -A citizen shall not be excluded or exempt from jury 
service on account of race, color, religion, sex, national 
origin, or economic status.- Utah Code Ann. § 78-46-3 (1987). 
We note that this section might operate to limit, upon timely 
objection, some reasons for the exercise for peremptory 
challenges that have been otherwise approved. See, e.g., 
Chambers, supra note 11 (membership in -fringe- or 
-non-mainstream- religion); Grady, supra note 11 (juror had 
held current job only one year). 
13. We note a recent Utah Supreme Court opinion suggesting 
that when a constitutional question involving liberty is 
presented, the appellate court is -obliged- to consider it even 
though it was not raised in the trial court. State v. Jameson, 
146 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 5 (1990). This -obligation- has not been 
evident in previous cases where Utah's appellate courts have 
refused to entertain constitutional challenges to criminal 
convictions, with incarceration (and therefore liberty) at 
stake, when those challenges had not been raised below. £as, 
e.g., Jolivet (sentence challenged as cruel and unusual 
punishment); State v. Van Matre, 777 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989) 
(claiming due process violation); State v. Pierce, 655 P.2d 676 
(Utah 1982) (per curiam) (claiming violation of state 
In Anderson, the Utah Supreme Court declined to consider 
a constitutional objection to a criminal sentence that had not 
been raised in the trial court, because the claimed error did 
not satisfy the "obviousness- requirement for plain error, 789 
P.2d at 29.14 That is, the alleged error was not one that 
should have been recognized by the trial court when it 
occurred. Id. Here, given that Harrison's trial jury had five 
women, the use of peremptory challenges to keep additional 
women from being seated could not have been obvious error. Nor 
has it been determined by Utah courts whether gender-based 
peremptory challenges are constitutionally or statutorily 
impermissible, so permitting such challenges was not obvious 
error. See Carlston, 776 P.2d at 655 (declining to express 
(Footnote 13 continued) 
constitutional right to not give evidence against self); State 
v. Winoer, 26 Utah 2d 118, 485 P.2d 1398 (1971) (claiming 
violation of fifth amendment right to silence); State v. Webb, 
790 P.2d 65 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (claimed fourth amendment 
violation); State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
(claimed violation of federal and state constitutional 
prohibitions against unreasonable arrest) . We believe that 
"the interest of predictability, accountability, and fairness-
would be served by a more careful examination of when Utah's 
appellate courts will consider issues not raised in the trial 
courts. Espinal v. Salt Lake Citv Bd. of Educ, 797 P.2d 412, 
415-16 (Utah 1990) (Bench, Court of Appeals Judge, 
concurring) . We further believe that the previously enunciated 
standards allowing first-time appellate review of issues are 
sufficiently liberal to provide appropriate redress, and are 
therefore troubled by a standard requiring review whenever a 
-liberty- interest is identified. 
In Espinal, Judge Bench urged a standard requiring both 
a liberty interest and exceptional circumstances before 
addressing constitutional issues raised for the first time on 
appeal. That suggested standard was not adopted in Jameson, 
where a liberty interest alone was apparently found sufficient 
to allow review. In this case, we do not find a liberty 
interest at stake because of the remoteness of the gender bias 
issue to Harrison's main claim of improper racial motivation. 
Sfifi ilia note 15, infra. The issue, as presented, has more to 
do with the public interest in a fair justice system than it 
does with Harrison's liberty. 
14. The other requirement for plain error is that the error be 
harmful. Anderson. 789 P.2d at 29. 
view on appropriateness of gender-based peremptory 
challenges).15 
The Jolivet court did not articulate the meaning of 
-exceptional circumstances.- However, in State v. Webb. 790 
P.2d 65 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), this court indicated that 
exceptional circumstances are those which would explain and 
excuse a party's failure to raise a claimed error in the trial 
court- Xd. at 78. Here, as with the appellant in Webb, we 
find "nothing in the record to suggest- that the gender 
discrimination objection to the State's peremptory challenges 
now raised by Harrison -was unknown or unavailable to him- at 
trial. Xd. Absent such circumstances explaining Harrison's 
failure to timely raise this objection, our entertaining it now 
would encourage a practice of withholding objections to jury 
selection until after an adverse verdict is returned, which we 
have previously refused to do. See Carlston, 776 P.2d at 
655-56. 
Prejudice-
Because we have determined that the trial court did not 
clearly err in finding no racial discrimination in the State's 
peremptory challenges, we do not reach the issue of whether 
Harrison was prejudiced by those challenges. However, if we 
had found clear error, Harrison's conviction could be affirmed 
only by showing that the error was -harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.- Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 
(1967) (quQtfifl in CantU I, 750 P.2d at 597).16 This is a 
difficult showing to make, and prosecutors 
15. Because Harrison failed to show obvious error, we need not 
consider whether he was harmed by the State's use of peremptory 
challenges to limit the number of women on the jury. We 
seriously doubt, however, that Harrison could demonstrate a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result had he been 
tried by a jury including six or seven women, as opposed to 
five. 
16. The burden required to show harmless state constitutional 
error is unsettled. State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 121 n.8 
(Utah 1989). But £L*. State v. Eaton, 569 P.2d 1114, 1116 (Utah 
1977) (federal and state constitutional error alleged: 
reasonable doubt whether error was prejudicial should be 
resolved in favor of defendant). 
who are questioned in the future about possibly improper 
peremptory juror challenges would do well to consider this in 
formulating their responses, making sure that they meet the 
Batson requirements. 
As things stand here, Mr. Harrison is not entitled to a 
new trial based upon the State's exercise of its peremptory 
challenges in choosing the trial jury. 
II. EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE 
We now turn to Harrison's contention that the exclusion 
of evidence about the Crips firebombing and the trial court's 
refusal to allow the reading of an adverse witness's allegedly 
inconsistent prior testimony to the jury were improper. 
On appeal, Harrison seeks to clothe these alleged errors 
in constitutional garb, claiming they amounted to a deprivation 
of his right to a fair trial.17 However, he did not advance 
constitutional arguments to the evidence exclusion in the trial 
court. Accordingly, we limit our analysis to the Utah Rules of 
Evidence implicated by Harrison's arguments to the trial court. 
In our analysis, we bear in mind the purposes for which 
the excluded evidence was offered by Harrison. Both items 
related to his contention that the shooting of Glover was 
justified as self-defense. This justification would be 
unavailable to Harrison if he were the aggressor in the 
(Footnote 16 continued) 
There is old authority suggesting that a conviction by an 
illegally-constituted jury is null. Sfifi State v. Bates. 22 
Utah 65, 61 P. 905 (1900) (conviction by eight-person jury 
under state law, where alleged offense occurred before 
statehood and therefore required trial before federally 
mandated twelve-person jury, was null). If this standard 
applied here, and Harrison's jury had been found to be 
illegally selected, a new trial would apparently be required 
regardless of any showing of prejudice. 
17. Harrison invokes the fifth, sixth, and fourteenth 
amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as 
article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution. 
PROSECUTORIAL VIOLATION OF MARITAL PRIVILEGE ISSUE 
the diaper bag was permissible under the fourth amendment. 
Consequently, there was no police illegality tainting the later 
request for and grant of permission to search the bag at the 
public safety building, when the gun was confiscated.30 The 
denial of Harrison's fourth amendment-based suppression motion 
was therefore appropriate. 
We also believe that, under Harrison's defense theory, 
admission of the pistol into evidence could not have prejudiced 
him. Harrison admitted the shooting, claiming self-defense. 
Admission of the pistol was therefore not the critical or sole 
factor tying him to the shooting. Therefore, even if the 
searches leading to police recovery of the pistol were 
improper, under these circumstances there was no reasonable 
likelihood of a different trial outcome had the gun been 
suppressed. 1 
IV. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 
Harrison presents a laundry list of instances of alleged 
prosecutorial misconduct. We consider only those instances to 
which timely objection was made by Harrison at trial and which, 
in the exercise of our discretion, warrant addressing in this 
written opinion. State v. Carter. 776 P.2d 886, 888-89 (Utah 
1989). The issues of concern here are whether Harrison was 
prejudiced by the prosecutor's remarks about Harrison's 
exercise of the marital privilege, and whether the prosecutor 
violated Harrison's right against self-incrimination. 
Marital Privilege-
Before trial, the State agreed that Harrison's wife 
would be barred from testifying under the marital privilege 
30. Indeed, it appears that no consent was necessary, because 
under our analysis the police could have confiscated the gun at 
the arrest scene. 
31. According to the record, Harrison's weapon was a 
relatively small, .25 caliber pistol. Admission of this type 
of weapon would not necessarily be inconsistent with Harrison's 
claim of self-defense. Prejudice would be more likely, of 
course, if the weapon were, for example, a shotgun, assault 
rifle, or other weapon not generally associated with private 
citizens seeking to protect themselves while out in public. 
statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8(1) (1987).32 A jury 
instruction incorporating the state constitutional version of 
the marital privilege was commented upon by the prosecutor in 
closing argument as follows: 
Instruction No. 10. This is a very 
interesting one. 
A married person may not be forced to 
testify in any criminal action against their 
spouse. 
What's the assistance of that? Well, 
there is a preliminary hearing of this matter 
on the 17th of May and the defendant gets 
married in July. And the trial is in August, 
Isn't it interesting that one of the two 
people who got told about the oun in 
fGlpversI wgjstband is the wife who canlt 
testify? 
(Emphasis added.) The comment ultimately attacked Harrison's 
trial testimony that Glover had been armed, an assertion he 
never made, at least to prosecutors or police, until trial. 
Harrison testified that he had not been completely silent about 
32. Section 78-24-8(1) (1987) reads, in pertinent part: 
A husband cannot be examined for or against 
his wife without her consent, nor a wife for 
or against her husband without his consent; 
nor can either during the marriage or 
afterwards be, without the consent of the 
other, examined as to any communication made 
by one to the other during the marriage . . . . 
The current version of the statute appears to limit the 
scope of the statutory privilege only to marital 
communications: "Neither a wife nor a husband may either during 
the marriage or afterwards be, without the consent of the 
other, examined as to any communication made by one to the 
other during the marriage.- Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8(1)(a) 
(Supp. 1990). However, article I, section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution provides, without limitation, that "a wife shall 
not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband 
against his wife . . . ." 
Glover's alleged gun before trial, claiming that he had told his 
wife and the wife of one of his companions about this shortly 
after the shooting. The companion's wife could not be located for 
trial, 
Harrison objected to the prosecutor's comment on his 
exercise of the marital privilege, but the trial court overruled 
the objection. On appeal, the State correctly concedes that the 
prosecutor's comment was improper. Ss& State v. Brown. 14 Utah 2d 
324, 383 P.2d 930 (1963). The State argues, however, that the 
comment was harmless error. 
State v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 54, 513 P.2d 422 (1973), sets 
forth a two part test for assessing whether improper counsel 
comments in a criminal case are harmless or warrant reversal. 
Such comments warrant reversal if (1) they call juror attention to 
matters which should not be considered in reaching a verdict; and 
(2) under the circumstances of the particular case, the jurors 
were probably influenced by the comments. 513 P.2d at 426.33 We 
equate the second part of this test with our usual standard for 
reversible error: reversal is required where there is a reasonable 
likelihood that, absent the error, defendant would have received a 
more favorable verdict. State v. Wilson, 771 P.2d 1077, 1080 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).34 
33. We consider the two part Valdez test to effectively supersede 
Brown. In Brown, appellant's rape conviction was reversed because 
of improper prosecutor comments on defendant's marital privilege 
without consideration of whether those comments were actually 
prejudicial and, indeed, despite the fact that the evidence in the 
case supported the conviction. The absence of a prejudice 
analysis in Brown was later criticized. See State v. Trustv. 28 
Utah 2d 317, 502 P.2d 113, 115 (1972) (Ellett, J., concurring). 
Part two of the Valdez analysis addresses the prejudice issue 
overlooked in Brown. 
34. We are aware of language in other cases suggesting that where 
a prosecutor's comment has the effect of destroying a privilege by 
inviting the jury to draw an adverse inference from its exercise, 
a conviction should be readily reversed. For example, in Trusty. 
the Utah Supreme Court stated that such a comment warrants a new 
trial if there is "a possibility that it prejudiced the defendant, 
in the sense that there is any likelihood that there may have been 
a different result . . . ." 502 P.2d at 114 (emphasis added). 
Part one of the Valdez test is satisfied here- The 
prosecutor's comment invited the jury to infer that Harrison 
used the marital privilege to hide relevant information. 
Indeed, it is apparent that the jury was also invited to infer 
that Harrison married his wife to prevent her from testifying. 
Neither inference should have been considered by the jury in 
reaching its verdict. 
In applying part two of the Valdez test/ it is 
appropriate to compare the likely impact of the improper 
prosecutor comment with other evidence of Harrison's guilt. 
State v. Trov, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984). We also look at 
the comment in relation to evidence that might absolve 
Harrison. Specifically, would the jury have been more likely 
to acquit Harrison, based on his self-defense claim, if the 
improper comment had not been made? 
The comment attacked, in a roundabout manner, Harrison's 
testimony that Glover had been armed with a gun. The 
allegation that Glover was armed was stressed in Harrison's 
(Footnote 34 continued) 
Later in the same opinion, however, the court indicated that it 
was applying a test of -whether in surveying the total 
circumstances it appears that there is any reasonable 
likelihood of any substantial prejudice to the defendant . . . .* 
X&. at 115 (emphasis added). 
Similarly, in State v. Eaton. 569 P.2d 1114 (Utah 1977), 
addressing a prosecutor's improper comment on the defendant's 
exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination, our 
supreme court stated: w[W]e believe that, on appeal, when there 
is a reasonable doubt as to whether the error below was 
prejudicial, that doubt should be resolved in favor of the 
defendant.- I£. at 1116. The same passage, however, indicated 
that the threshold for reversal for such a comment would be "a 
reasonable likelihood that in its absence there may have been a 
different result . . . ." Id. Eaton was later cited to 
support the latter standard for reversal, in a case where a 
wife testified for the State over the defendant husband's 
objection. See State v. Bundv, 684 P.2d 58, 61 (Utah 1984). 
It appears, therefore, that in order to reconcile the slight 
semantic difference, a determination of a reasonable likelihood 
of a different result should subsume the notion that any doubts 
as to prejudice are to be resolved in favor of an accused. See 
Slfifl Chaoman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23-24 (1967) (-little, 
if any- difference exists between the two standards). 
trial defense. •* In response, the prosecutor impeached 
Harrison's testimony by eliciting his admission that he had not 
told police or prosecutors about Glover's gun until trial. 
The testimony of Terron Horton, the only other witness claiming 
to have possibly seen Glover's gun, was impeached on the basis 
of his not having reported it in his initial statement to 
investigators. No gun was recovered from Glover, and no other 
witness reported that Glover had a gun at any time on the night 
of the shooting. The jury thus had ample reason to reject the 
assertion that Glover had been armed, quite apart from any 
impact the prosecutor's comment may have had. Accordingly, we 
see no reasonable likelihood of a more favorable verdict had 
the comment not been made. The comment was, therefore, 
harmless error. 
Self-incrimination* 
Harrison contends that the following comment in the 
prosecutor's closing argument was an improper use of his 
post-arrest silence against him: 
The most incredible story, the added detail of 
the chrome plated revolver that he saw so well 
from a distance of fifteen feet sticking out 
of the waistband of the dead man. Waistband? 
Waistband? On a dark end street with some 
back lit things from the Persepolis 
restaurant? He's so sure he saw that that 
he's willing to kill a man. No, that's an 
added detail. He made that up later. He 
never tells anybody about that. 
The trial court overruled Harrison's objection that this was an 
improper comment on his post-arrest silence, holding that 
Harrison had waived his right to remain silent by testifying, 
and that the comment was simply one on the credibility of his 
testimony. Earlier cross-examination questions relating to 
Harrison's failure to report Glover's "chrome gun" before trial 
had also elicited objections. 
The challenged questions and argument were, again, part 
of the prosecutor's efforts to impeach Harrison's claim that 
35. The allegation was not, however, critical to Harrison's 
self-defense claim. The jury was instructed that apparent 
peril, without actual peril, could support a self-defense 
claim. Thus Harrison's belief that Glover had a gun, if 
reasonable, could have supported the self-defense theory. 
SEARCH AND SEIZURE ISSUE 
reveals lengthy and labyrinthine questioning of Bray, both at 
trial and at the preliminary hearing, on just what Harrison 
said, and when, regarding whether he left the Persepolis to get 
his gun after the initial confrontation with Glover and 
company. The trial court painstakingly examined Bray's 
testimony, considering his responses in the context of the 
questioning. Its finding that the preliminary hearing 
testimony was not inconsistent with Bray's trial testimony is 
not clearly erroneous, so we leave that finding undisturbed. 
The trial court's exclusion of Bray's preliminary 
hearing testimony would have also been proper under Utah R. 
Evid. 403, which permits the exclusion of evidence when "its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Valid 
considerations of confusion and waste of time were present 
here. We can affirm the trial court's ruling on this proper 
alternative ground. State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257, 260 (Utah 
1985).24 Finally, as noted regarding exclusion of the 
firebombing incident, there is no indication that admission of 
the preliminary hearing testimony would have been reasonably 
likely to result in a more favorable trial outcome for Harrison. 
III. SEARCH OF DIAPER BAG 
Harrison's third claimed error is that the search of the 
diaper bag, where his gun was found, violated his rights 
against unreasonable search and seizure, and, therefore, the 
gun should not have been admitted into evidence. Harrison 
cites both the fourth amendment to the United States 
Constitution and the Utah Constitution art. I, § 14, but does 
not argue that the two provisions should be construed 
differently. Our analysis is therefore limited to the fourth 
amendment. 
The trial court found that the diaper bag was under the 
principal custody and control of Harrison's wife, and that Mrs. 
Harrison freely and voluntarily consented to the search of the 
24. See also Utah R. Evid. 611(a) (trial court to reasonably 
control evidence presentation for purposes of effective 
truthfinding, avoiding waste of time, and protecting witnesses 
from harassment). 
bag. We do not overturn fact findings underlying a decision to 
suppress or admit evidence unless they are clearly erroneous. 
State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Legal conclusions based on those findings, however, are 
reviewed on a nondeferential, correction of error basis. Id. 
Custody and Control* 
Evidence in the suppression hearing showed that Harrison 
was living apart from his wife and children at the time of the 
arrest, so there is no clear error in finding that the diaper 
bag was primarily under Mrs. Harrison's custody and control. 
However, the trial court did not state the legal conclusion it 
drew from this finding. 
The State invites us to infer that the finding 
represents a conclusion that Harrison lacked standing to 
challenge the search. Such a conclusion lacks legal support. 
In Minnesota v. Olson, U.S. , 110 S.Ct. 1684 (1990), the 
United States Supreme Court held that an overnight houseguest 
had a sufficient privacy interest in the occupied premises to 
challenge his warrantless arrest therein. The Harrisons 
testified at the suppression hearing that when they were 
together with the children, both had access to the diaper bag 
for child care purposes. As with the homeowner and her guest 
in Qlsfin, 1 1 0 S.Ct. at 1689, Mrs. Harrison's ultimate ownership 
of and control over the diaper bag was not inconsistent with 
Harrison also having a legitimate privacy expectation in it. 
Therefore, Harrison had standing to challenge the search. 
The finding that Mrs. Harrison had custody and control 
of the diaper bag also meant that she had authority to consent 
to its search, and that separate consent from Harrison was 
unnecessary. It is quite clear that either party sharing joint 
use of property can, under the fourth amendment, give valid 
consent to a search of that property. Frazier v. CUDD. 394 
U.S. 731, 740 (1969) (consent to search defendant's duffel bag 
was binding on defendant when given by co-user of bag). 
Therefore, Mrs. Harrison's consent, if valid, was sufficient to 
permit the search. 
Validity of Mrs. Harrison's Consent. 
A warrantless search is per se improper under the fourth 
amendment unless a specific exception applies. Katz v. United 
SlLaiSi, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); State v. Arrovo. 796 P.2d 
684, 687 (Utah 1990). The State has the burden of showing that 
such an exception, in this case valid consent to the search, 
applies. Arroyo. 796 P.2d at 687. 
Consent to search the diaper bag was obtained from Mrs, 
Harrison following her arrest, at the public safety building 
where she had been taken for questioning.^5 Harrison does not 
contest the trial court's finding that this consent was freely 
and voluntarily given. However, this finding, by itself, does 
not support a conclusion that the consent was valid. 
In Arroyo, the Utah Supreme Court held that, for a 
consent to a search to be valid, the consent must be 
voluntarily given and not obtained by exploitation of prior 
illegal police conduct. 796 P.2d at 688. In essence, as 
applied here, the second part of this test is necessary to 
deter police from using illegal means to uncover reasons to 
seek consent for a search. -Police should not be permitted to 
ratify their own illegal conduct by merely obtaining a 
[voluntary] consent after the illegality has occurred.- Id. at 
689. 
At the suppression hearing, Mrs. Harrison testified that 
she consented to the diaper bag search because she had seen a 
police officer search the bag and find the gun earlier, at the 
arrest scene. She believed that withholding her consent after 
the fact would be futile, akin to closing the barn door after 
the horses have escaped. The detective who sought her consent 
testified that he did so based on an arresting officer's report 
that the diaper bag appeared to contain a gun. Therefore both 
the request for and the grant of Mrs. Harrison's consent to 
search the bag at the public safety building were prompted by 
police conduct at the arrest scene. If that conduct was 
illegal, Mrs. Harrison's consent was probably invalid. 
The trial court never entered a specific finding related 
to the legality of police handling of the diaper bag at the 
arrest scene. ° The burden was on the State to justify any 
25. The record does not reveal the crime for which Mrs. 
Harrison was arrested. Harrison, however, does not contend 
that his wife's arrest was illegal. Therefore, we presume her 
arrest was proper. 
26. We have recently indicated our approval of the practice in 
many jurisdictions of requiring specific fact findings to 
support a trial court's decision on a motion to suppress, gee 
State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 882 n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Where specific findings are required, failure to enter such 
findings is reversible error unless the facts in the record 
search of the diaper bag. Harrison argues that the diaper bag 
was illegally searched at the arrest scene.27 The State 
argues that the arrest scene search of the diaper bag was legal 
because it was incident to the Harrisons' arrest. 
A contemporaneous, warrantless search of the area within 
an arrestee's immediate control is permissible for the purpose 
of recovering weapons the arrestee might reach, or to prevent 
concealment or destruction of evidence of the crime. Chimel v. 
California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969); State v. Harris. 671 P.2d 
175, 180 (Utah 1983). Both justifications were present here. 
Police sought Harrison because they believed that he had been 
involved in Glover's shooting. Upon finding and arresting 
Harrison, it was reasonable for police to believe that he might 
have a gun within his control, and that the gun might be 
evidence of a crime. 
The area of "immediate control- can extend to a closed 
container left in the passenger area of a car, even after the 
arrestee has been moved away from the car. New York v. Bel ton. 
453 U.S. 454, 461 (1981). See also State v. Houser. 669 P.2d 
437, 440 (Utah 1983) (per curiam) (search of arrestee's 
backpack permissible); State v. Kent. 665 P.2d 1317, 1318 (Utah 
1983) (search of passenger area of car permissible where 
arrestee was handcuffed and lying on ground next to car); In re 
K.K.C., 636 P.2d 1044, 1046 (Utah 1981) (per curiam) (search of 
pickup cab and bed, including unlocked container therein, 
permissible although arrestee removed from truck). 
(Footnote 26 continued) 
-are clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a 
finding in favor of the judgment." Kinkella v. Bauah. 660 P.2d 
233, 236 (Utah 1983). Because the Utah Supreme Court had not 
issued its Arroyo opinion while Harrison's case was before the 
trial court, it may not have been clear to the trial court that 
findings on both voluntariness and the legality of prior police 
conduct were needed for consent to a warrantless search to be 
valid. We therefore examine the record in this case to see if 
the facts on record support a conclusion that police conduct at 
the arrest scene was legal. 
27. As noted earlier, there is dispute over whether the diaper 
bag was fully searched at the arrest scene or simply -patted 
down." If a full search of the bag was proper incident to the 
arrest, this dispute becomes meaningless. Therefore for our 
analysis we will accept as true Mrs. Harrison's assertion that 
the bag was fully searched. 
In this case, the Harrisons were ordered to the ground 
and searched by arresting police. The record indicates that 
the baby stroller and diaper bag were approximately ten feet 
away from them at this time- This distance, coupled with the 
fact that the Harrisons were individually guarded, raises doubt 
that the diaper bag was in either of the Harrisons* immediate 
control, in terms of either of them being able to reach into it 
before officers could intervene.2° However, the arrestees in 
Belton. Houser, Kent/ and KtK,C>, supra, were similarly removed 
from the searched areas, and those searches were upheld. 9 
Here, the diaper bag was sufficiently within the Harrisons* 
immediate control, as that term has been construed, to permit 
its search incident to their arrest. 
A separate safety concern also justified searching the 
diaper bag at the arrest scene. Even if the bag were outside 
any realistic control by the Harrisons, there was no way to 
secure it at the scene pending the obtaining of a warrant to 
search it. The bag, stroller, and babies were going to be 
moved. Additionally, babies being babies, somebody would need 
to get into the bag before long. If that somebody were Mrs. 
Harrison, it was reasonable to ensure there was no weapon in 
the bag that she might obtain or hide. It was also reasonable 
to protect anyone else who might move or get into the bag for 
baby care against the possible existence and accidental 
discharge of a loaded weapon within. 
Concerns both for safety and preservation of evidence 
were present, and under applicable case law the diaper bag was 
sufficiently within the Harrisons' control to allow its 
search. We hold, therefore, that the arrest scene search of 
28. Additionally, the record reveals that Mr. Harrison was 
handcuffed and was taken away in a patrol car just before the 
diaper bag was searched. 
29. In Belton, the Supreme Court recognized the difficulty of 
workably defining the area within an arrestee's immediate 
control. In the context of the search of the passenger area of 
a car from which the arrestee has been removed, the Court noted 
that such an area is one into which "generally, even if not 
inevitably," the arrestee might reach. 453 U.S. at 460. 
Police restraint and physical removal of the arrestee, then, 
while limiting the arrestee's ability to actually reach into a 
particular area, does not automatically prohibit police from 
searching that area. 
the diaper bag was permissible under the fourth amendment. 
Consequently, there was no police illegality tainting the later 
request for and grant of permission to search the bag at the 
public safety building, when the gun was confiscated.30 The 
denial of Harrison's fourth amendment-based suppression motion 
was therefore appropriate. 
We also believe that, under Harrison's defense theory, 
admission of the pistol into evidence could not have prejudiced 
him. Harrison admitted the shooting, claiming self-defense. 
Admission of the pistol was therefore not the critical or sole 
factor tying him to the shooting. Therefore, even if the 
searches leading to police recovery of the pistol were 
improper, under these circumstances there was no reasonable 
likelihood of a different trial outcome had the gun been 
suppressed.31 
IV. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 
Harrison presents a laundry list of instances of alleged 
prosecutorial misconduct. We consider only those instances to 
which timely objection was made by Harrison at trial and which, 
in the exercise of our discretion, warrant addressing in this 
written opinion. State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 888-89 (Utah 
1989). The issues of concern here are whether Harrison was 
prejudiced by the prosecutor's remarks about Harrison's 
exercise of the marital privilege, and whether the prosecutor 
violated Harrison's right against self-incrimination. 
Marital Privilege-
Before trial, the State agreed that Harrison's wife 
would be barred from testifying under the marital privilege 
30. Indeed, it appears that no consent was necessary, because 
under our analysis the police could have confiscated the gun at 
the arrest scene. 
31. According to the record, Harrison's weapon was a 
relatively small, .25 caliber pistol. Admission of this type 
of weapon would not necessarily be inconsistent with Harrison's 
claim of self-defense. Prejudice would be more likely, of 
course, if the weapon were, for example, a shotgun, assault 
rifle, or other weapon not generally associated with private 
citizens seeking to protect themselves while out in public. 
APPENDIX 2 
SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
I DO SOLEMNLY SWEAR that I will support, obey and defend the Constitution of the 
United States and the Constitution of this State; that I will discharge the duties of attorney and 
counselor at law as an officer of the courts of this State with honesty and fidelity; and that I will 
strictly observe the Rules of Professional Conduct promulgated by the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah, so help me God. 
State of Utah 
ss. 
County of Salt Lake 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 
day of , 19 
Clerk, Supreme Court of Utah 
Constitution of Utah, Article IV section 1 
The rights of citizens of the State of Utah to vote and 
hold office shall not be denied or abridged on account of 
sex. Both male and female citizens of this State shall enjoy 
equally all civil, political and religious rights and 
privileges. 
Utah Code Ann. section 78-46-3 
A citizen shall not be excluded or exempt from jury 
service on account of race, color, religion, sex, national 
origin, or economic status. 
Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 3.8 
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall: 
(a) Refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor 
knows is not supported by probable cause; 
(b) Make reasonable efforts to assure that the accused 
has been advised of the right to, and the procedure for 
obtaining, counsel and has been given reasonable opportunity 
to obtain counsel; 
(c) Not seek to obtain from an unrepresented accused a 
waiver of important pretrial rights, such as the right to a 
preliminary hearing; 
(d) Make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence 
or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate 
the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense, and, in 
connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense all 
unprivileged mitigating information known to the prosecutor, 
except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility 
by a protective order of the tribunal; and 
(e) Exercise reasonable care to prevent investigators, 
law enforcement personnel, employees or other persons 
assisting or associated with the prosecutor in a criminal case 
from making an extrajudicial statement that the prosecutor 
would be prohibited from making under Rule 3.6. 
APPENDIX 3 
For examples of cases demonstrating that harmless error 
analysis does not apply to illegal jury selection, see e.g. 
Commonwealth v. Soares. 387 N.E.2d 499 (Mass. 1979) 
(peremptory challenge exercised on basis of group bias 
per se reversible error), cert, denied. 444 U.S. 881 
(1979); 
State v. Madison. 213 A.2d 880 (Md. 1965)(if grand jury is 
selected in illegal manner, no prejudice need be shown to 
justify dismissal of indictment); 
United States v. De Gross. 913 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 
1990)(conviction reversed on basis of improper peremptory 
challenge without harmless error analysis); 
Gray v. Mississippi. 481 U.S. 648 (1987)(harmless error 
analysis does not apply when juror in capital case 
improperly excused for cause on basis of opposition to 
capital punishment); 
Rose v. Mitchell. 443 U.S. 545 (1979)(racial discrimination 
in grand jury selection requires reversal of conviction 
without harmless error analysis); 
Vasquez v. Hillery. 474 U.S. 254 (1986)(systematic 
exclusion of blacks from grand jury system requires 
reversal of conviction without harmless error analysis); 
Alvarado v. United States. 497 U.S. , 111 L.Ed.2d 439, 
110 S.Ct. (1990)(case remanded to lower court for 
reevaluation in light of solicitor general's concession 
that claim of Batson error was not mollified by fact that 
actual jury selected comported with sixth amendment 
standards). 
